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The would-be sorcerer alone has faith in the efficacy of pure knowledge;  
rational people know that things act of themselves or not at all. (Wolfe,  
2000: 17)  
 
 
"Action is not done under the full control of consciousness; action should  
rather be felt as a node, a knot, and a conglomerate of many surprising 
sets  
of agencies that have to be slowly disentangled". (Latour, 2005: 44)  
 
 
 
‗We live in financial times‘. Such goes the new and rather clever tag-line  
supporting the redesign of the business newspaper Financial Times (FT)  
in April 2007. Clever because it makes the FT seem so perfectly attuned to  
the times. During the first half of 2007 discussions of Private Equity  
extended to the front pages of mainstream newspapers and even our  
television screens. Then in late July the ‗Credit Squeeze‘ started to 
unfold,  
turning 2007 into the financial world‘s ‗most traumatic year since the  
1987 crash‘.1 On 14 September 2007 the UK bank Northern Rock went to  
the Bank of England for emergency funding, causing the first bank run in  
140 years. Suddenly rather arcane terms like CDO (Collateralised Debt  
Obligation), CDS (Credit Default Swap) and CFD (Contract for Difference)  
were explained to us at great length in the popular media.2 We live in  
financial times indeed!  
 
The three books I review here help us better to understand how the  
financial world ticks. They all pay attention to the empirical intricacies  
of agency and borrow to a large extent their analytical perspectives from  
actor-network theory (ANT). They also interrelate at various points,  
most signifi cantly in addressing the relation between social theories and  
(financial) markets, and thus help explain and contextualize each other.  
Not surprising then that Donald MacKenzie (2007) ended up writing a  
review of Caitlin Zaloom‘s book. He praised her ‗superb book‘ for fi lling  
an important gap: ‗Despite the role it has played in shaping today‘s world,  
there are few observational studies of financial trading to complement  
the thousands of econometric studies of price fluctuations‘ (p. 22).  
 
Out of the Pits  
 
Out of the Pits is a double-site ethnography. Zaloom worked as a clerk at  
CBOT (Chicago Board of Trade) and later as a trader in London dealing  
in European futures products. In Chicago she witnessed the great debate  
on whether to go digital (screen based trading) or retain the open-outcry  
trading system in the ‗pits‘. In London she experienced the aftermath of  
the move to an electronic dealing room. Experiences of the trading fl oor  
and the dealing room were supplemented with meetings, archival research  
and interviews. Chapters 1, 2 and 4 take us from the beginnings of CBOT  
in 1848 and its first purpose-designed building (1885), through to the 
exchange‘s  
1930 (still existing) signature building and to ‗pit-life‘ in the late  
20th century. The third chapter sketches the recent history of London‘s  
financial markets. The last three chapters (called ‗Economic Men‘, ‗The  
Discipline of the Speculator‘ and ‗Ambiguous Numbers‘, respectively) give  
us themed insights into the life of traders in both locations: what drives  
them, the selves that are constructed in the act of trading, the ‗maverick  
aesthetics‘ and ‗grotesqueries of the dealing room‘. Zaloom paints a 
picture  
of traders ‗who operate at the heart of modern capitalist economies  
[and] take risks with money and self every day‘ (p. 95) but are instructed  
‗not to think‘ so that they remain flexible and ready to react immediately  
to changes in the market, a market that one can experience directly as one  
becomes ‗a part of this living thing, intimately connected to it‘ (p. 105).  
The adrenaline rush of trading and the feeling of ‗being in the zone‘ come  
with the gut-level immediacy of being directly inside and surrounded  
by the market. Traders create stories around the shifting directions of  
numbers that economists consider a ‗random walk‘. Yet, they also strip  
money of any social connotations, ‗ticks‘ being the currency of the  
market: ‗Distinguishing money from ticks allows traders to separate the  
consequences of good and bad trades from the necessities of everyday  
life outside the market‘ (p. 131). The dealing room is a place where space  
and time as we understand them have been suspended, and there is only  
the rush to win a monetary gain. The picture of homo oeconomicus that  
emerges is ultimately a rather garish one: ‗Taking advantage of chaos in  
the economy and of other people‘s losses to make a profit is the stock-
intrade  
of speculation. Economic man delights in the carnage‘ (p. 117).3  
 
Zaloom also explores at length the new informational matrix that emerged  
following the transition from pit to electronic trading.4 This transition 
was  
driven by the search for the ‗perfect market‘, anonymous and atomistic,  
fitting snugly within narratives of progressive rationalization. These 
position  
technology as a force of efficiency that facilitates calculation based  
solely on prices and other financial abstractions. Yet, Zaloom shows time  
and again (in different periods and different places) how social ties, 
theories  
and emo tions are always an intrinsic part of the market. It is worth  
quoting her at some length on this matter:  
 
During the construction of the 1930 building, as well as in the transition  
to electronic trading, managers and transnational trading fi rms worked to  
extricate the market from the web of personal relationships. Although 
social  
ties create the basis among traders for understanding and analyzing the  
market, the effort to create spaces, technologies, individuals, and 
representations  
that express pure market rea son is a key part of the rationalization  
process. Whenever market designers move to rationalize the marketplace,  
traders work to resituate rationalized information within their distinctive  
ways of understanding, interpreting, and calculating … The ‗rational,  
purposeful pursuit of interests‘ that marks the autonomous economic sphere  
is not a natural tendency, but a project that requires strategic 
construction,  
constant vigilance, mainte nance, and repair. (pp.162–164)  
 
Zaloom argues persuasively that financial markets are not an imperfectly  
insulated area of economic rationality, but a sphere in which the economic  
and the social interweave seamlessly. The processes that produce abstract  
information in financial markets are not themselves abstract: ‗Managers  
and designers integrate people, technologies, places, and aesthetics into  
a zone of autonomous economic action‘ (p. 177). In developing her argument  
she borrows from the ANT vocabulary, starting in chapter 1 where  
she references authors such as Michel Callon, Bruno Latour and John Law.  
She talks about ‗socio-technical arrangements‘, about the need to un 
derstand  
how machines and humans are tied together into a fi nancial system,  
and the need to focus on the relationship between technologies and  
practices that are linked through ‗practical experiments in 
rationalization‘  
 
(p. 171). Still the book is very much (ANT) theory-light, and perhaps  
justifiably so. For a more theory-orientated book we now turn to Donald  
MacKenzie.  
An Engine, Not a Camera  
 
MacKenzie‘s background in science and technology studies makes him  
familiar with the arguments and concepts put forward by ANT proponents.  
 
 
His earlier research on how scientists stabilize and produce the world they  
set out to discover particularly honed his interest in the theoretical 
concept  
that underpins this book: performativity (in the strongest sense).5 He  
traces this rather elegant concept back to J. L.Austin‘s speech act theory  
via Michel Callon (2005). The title of the book, with a little nod to 
Milton  
Friedman, expresses MacKenzie‘s key assertion: ‗Financial economics … did  
more than analyze markets; it altered them. It was an ‗engine‘ … an active  
force transforming its environment, not a camera pas sively recording it‘  
 
(p. 12). In other words, it was both cognitive and creative. As various 
contributors  
to MacKenzie‘s edited volume elaborate on, and problematize the  
concept of performativity, I will postpone a critical discussion until the  
final pages of this review. To start us off, the following digest of the 
key  
issues suffi ces:  
Has the practical use of fi nance theory … altered market processes toward  
greater conformity to theory? If the answer to that question is at least  
partially in the affirmative, we have iden tified a process shaping the  
financial markets—and via those markets perhaps even the wider economies  
and societies of high modernity—that has not received anything like 
sufficient  
attention. If, on the other hand, the practical use of fi nance theory  
sometimes undermines the market conditions, processes, and patterns of  
prices that are posited by the theory we may have found a source of danger  
that it is easy to ignore or to underestimate if ‗reality‘ is conceived of 
as  
existing entirely independently of its theoretical depiction. (p. 24)  
 
Whilst theoretically sophisticated, An Engine, Not a Camera also offers us  
another ripping Chicago yarn, tracing the intertwining fates of the Chicago  
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) and the Black-Scholes-Merton option  
pricing model. The book takes the form of a series of historical narratives 
on  
the development of finance theory and on its interaction with the modern  
fi nancial markets, based to a signifi cant extent on a set of 60 oral-
history  
interviews with finance theorists and senior market participants. The tone  
is set in the ominous opening sentence: ‗Chicago, late evening, October 19,  
1987 … ‘. Crises, meltdowns and crashes very much frame the theoretical  
explorations and propel the narrative along.6 We even encounter the 
occasional  
hero or two along the way. Admittedly, after the cracking start the  
reader is in danger of becoming rather bogged down in the first couple of  
chapters where MacKenzie provides a detailed history of modern fi nance  
theory. Whilst he ably demonstrates the ties between fi nancial theories  
(the Capital Asset Pricing Model; the effi cient-market hypothesis, random- 
walk models of stock-price changes) and their application, one cannot shake  
off the feeling that his proposed hypothesis that these models might7 (!)  
have had an impact on the structure and practice of financial markets is  
perhaps a little tepid.  
 
Much stronger (and riveting) is the argument developed in chapters 5, 6,  
and 7 which explore the unfolding performativity of option pricing theory  
in financial markets. Here the details are less distracting and helpfully  
provide additional circumstantial evidence to an earlier joint paper on the  
performativity of the Black-Scholes-Merton model (MacKenzie and Millo,  
2003). MacKenzie sketches three distinct phases: from 1973 until 1976  
when there were substantial differences between observed option prices  
and values imputed by the model; from 1976 until the summer of 1987  
during which the model was an excellent fit to observed prices; and from  
autumn 1987 to the present when the model‘s fit again has been poor (with  
a persisting volatility skew or ‗smile‘). What is particularly interesting 
is  
that at first the correspondence between the Black-Scholes-Merton model  
and patterns of CBOE prices was fairly poor. The model certainly did not  
describe an already existing world ‗out-there‘. However, its use in 
arbitrage  
and the effects of that arbitrage reduced discrepancies be tween empirical  
prices and the model, especially in the matter of the fl at-line 
relationship  
between implied volatility and strike price: ‗The ―practice‖ that the BSM  
model sustained helped to create a reality in which the model was indeed  
―substantially confirmed‖‘ (p. 166). Thus a performative loop between  
theory and reality was established. Gradually the financial markets changed  
in such a way that market prices moved towards the postulates of the model.  
It came to shape the very way participants thought and talked about 
options,  
in particular via the notion of ‗implied volatility‘. But it was not all 
just  
down to talk; they used Black‘s sheets8 as a material means of calculation,  
thus connecting the apparently abstract mathematics of the model to the  
physical action on exchange trading floors. Yet, as MacKenzie points out,  
we cannot establish a simple linear causal relationship between model and  
reality, ‗ … the year of its publication also saw the opening in Chicago of 
the  
first modern options exchange, and the development of organized options  
trading would have had an effect on patterns of prices quite independent  
of the model‘ (p. 256). The performativity of classic option pricing theory  
was therefore certainly not a matter of simply discovering the correct way  
to price options. For MacKenzie it was a contested, historically contingent  
outcome, ended by a historical event, the 1987 crash, which introduced a  
seemingly permanent volatility skew. The assumption of ‗mild‘ randomness  
of the model may have even helped to generate the ‗wild‘ randomness  
seen in 1987 (and later in 1998 with the collapse of the super hedge fund  
LTCM, discussed in detail in chapter 8). The adoption of Mandelbrot‘s  
wildly random infinite-variance Lévy distributions post-1987 can be  
seen as counterperformative move: ‗In Chicago, where a Black-Scholes  
world was performed, a radically different world is now institutionalized  
in risk-management techniques … The goal is not performativity but  
counterperformativity: to assume ―wild‖ randomness in order to lessen  
the chance of its man ifesting itself‘ (p. 210).  
 
Throughout the book MacKenzie takes great care to stress that we are  
not just dealing here with beliefs and world views. The Black-Scholes- 
Merton model could not have been performed in the markets had it  
remained simply a conceptualization in economists‘ heads: ‗While beliefs  
about markets are clearly important … a form of incorporation that is in  
some senses deeper is incorporation into algorithms, procedures, routines,  
and material devices‘ (p. 19). An agencement in other, specifi cally ANT,  
words. As Callon (2007: 320) elaborates:  
 
What MacKenzie describes with surgical precision is the gradual 
actualization  
of the world of the [BSM] for mula … through the intense work  
of articulating, experimenting, and observing that has been required to  
produce the gradual, mutual adjustment of sociotechnical agencements and  
formulas … what makes this process possible is the performative dimension  
of the statements and the trials they allow.  
 
On the Performativity of Economics (or Performing Performativity)  
 
How can a discourse be outside the reality that it describes and 
simultaneously  
participate in the construction of that reality as an object by act ing  
on it? To this paradoxical question the concept of performativity provides  
a convincing and general answer. (Callon, 2007: 316)  
 
It is true that reality is the criterion for the correctness of thought. 
But reality  
is not, it becomes—and to become the participation of thought is required.  
(Lukács, 1922: 204)  
 
The aim of the collected volume by MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu is ‗to put  
the notion of ‗the performativity of economics‘ to the test of bringing it 
to  
bear on various aspects of economic life and economic science‘ (p. 7). As  
such these essays allow us to revisit and critically examine the concept  
of performativity and to elaborate on the importance of agencements.9  
They also provide further examples and contexts for claims made in the  
other two books. For example, Garcia-Parpet‘s study of the introduction  
of a computerized market for strawberries at a village in the Loire valley  
reinforces Zaloom‘s and MacKenzie‘s findings that markets cannot simply  
be seen as the spontaneous appearance of a mecha nism for liberating  
economic energies which came into being because of the rationality and  
efficiency of its procedures: ‗The prac tices which constitute the market 
are  
not market practices‘ (p. 37). Guala argues in his chapter that the 
invisible  
hand so beloved of economists, ‗requires a lot of fine-tuning and tinkering  
in order reliably and consistently to transform individual greed into  
social benefits‘ (p. 150).  
 
As the title of the book indicates, most of the chapters engage in a  
multitude of ways with the concept of ‗performativity‘: challenging,  
elaborating, and mut(il)ating. Several authors actually suggest to do away  
with the concept altogether (Didier, Mirowski and Nik-Nah)10 or at least  
use a different term (e.g. ‗expression‘) that better captures the actual 
processes  
at work, claiming ‗performativity‘ overplays linguistic and textual  
practices and thus leaves material practices in the background (Lépinay).  
The most substantial contribution to the book—both in terms of length and  
of engagement with the concept of performativity—comes from Michel  
Callon and in the rest of this review I will borrow heavily from his 
chapter.  
If the issue is ‗not (only) about economics being ―right‖ or ―wrong‖ but 
(also,  
and perhaps more important) about it being ―able‖ or ―unable‖ to transform  
the world‘ (p. 2) as the editors suggest, then this locates the book fi 
rmly  
within the pragmatist tradition according to Callon. Instead of regarding  
statements as true or false, pragmatism conceptualizes them as successful  
or failed. For Callon, ANT adds to the pragmatist tradition a distinctive  
focus on the agencements11 that generate success and failure:  
 
A socio-techni cal agencement includes the statement(s) pointing to it, and  
it is because the former includes the latter that the agencement acts in 
line  
with the statement, just as the operating instructions are part of the 
device  
and participate in making it work. (p. 320)  
 
What we often consider as a struggle between statements or theories is  
for Callon a struggle between sociotechnical agencements: ‗It is not the  
environment that decides and selects the state ments that will survive; it 
is  
the statements that determine the environ ments required for their 
survival‘  
 
(p. 335). Guala, in his chapter, shows how science provides an accurate  
description of at best only niches of the real world. These niches are  
actually artificially created to give the theory its ‗best shot‘, by 
eliminating  
all the distur bances and the imperfections that normally impede its 
application  
to ‗naturally occurring‘ circumstances. If economic rationality is a  
fragile property that must be carefully preserved by creating a hospitable  
environment, then the same goes for the concept of performativity itself.  
It is therefore not surprising that virtually all the discussions of 
performativity  
in MacKenzie‘s work focus on the ‗surgical precision‘ (cf. Callon,  
2007: 320) of the Black-Scholes-Merton case, which indeed offers a 
carefully  
crafted niche. What matters is not so much the ‗truth‘ or possible 
theoretical  
foundations of MacKenzie‘s assertions, but rather their transformative  
capacity in terms of research and theoretical practices. Discussions of  
performativity in journals, books and at conferences draw in actors and  
resources. For example, when a reviewer in the Journal of Economics  
(Schlag, 2007: 90) suggests that An Engine, Not a Camera ‗is certainly of  
interest to (younger) financial economists who would like to get an idea  
of the interaction between academic research and the developments of  
financial markets‘ then that is an indication of a potentially 
transformative  
action. Critique is useful in propelling this transformative capacity along  
(with the concept of performativity mutating in the process—indeed  
Callon prefers to talks about ‗performation‘ in his chapter), but also 
somewhat  
besides the (ANT) point if it just aims to prove there is no solid  
foundation to ‗performativity‘ and that after taking the concept carefully  
apart there seems to be not much there. As Culler (1981) argued in the  
context of semiotics, for a concept to do its work we often have to take  
for granted and pass over in silence numerous complicated conventions.  
Agency always overflows (Callon, 2005; Latour, 2005), even the agency of  
the performativity agencement: ‗The history of science is nothing but the  
long and interminable series of untimely overflowings, of sociotechnical  
agencements that have been caught out, unable to disci pline and frame  
the entities that they assemble (Callon, 2007: 323).  
 
For Callon, ‗performativity is relevant only if it is further refined by 
the  
semiotic turn and the ANT turn‘ (p. 328). This pragmatic-cum-semiotic  
turn is exemplified in the work of philosopher J. L. Austin who criticized  
the idea that the function of language is essentially representative, and  
who introduced the famous distinction between constative utterances (e.g.  
‗the structure of DNA is a double helix‘) and performative utterances (e.g.  
‗I baptize you‘). A performative utterance is a spe cific kind of statement  
or expression that establishes its referent through the very act of 
uttering;  
it causes the reality it describes to exist (e.g. being baptized is the 
consequence  
of an act of language). Performative utterances belong to a class  
of speech acts which get something done rather than to the discourse of  
description. We can therefore speak of a constative utterance, one which  
aims to describe the world, as either true or false; but it would not make  
sense to speak of a performative statement as either correctly or 
incorrectly  
‗reflecting‘ reality. Performative statements are not simply a matter of  
linguistics MacKenzie argues in his contribution to the edited volume: ‗we  
must also always inquire into the social, cultural, and political nature of  
the ―conditions of felicity‖ of the process‘ (p. 78). Or, as Eagleton put 
it  
rather prosaically, ‗I cannot baptize a badger, and will probably have made  
things worse if I am not a clergyman anyway‘ (Eagleton, 1996: 103). In  
attempting to make the distinction more precise, in the end Austin came  
to admit that even statements of fact, or ‗constative‘ language, are acts  
of informing or affirming, and to communicate information is as much a  
‗performance‘ as baptizing a child. So much for solid foundations …. 12  
 
Perhaps a final point to elaborate on is the distinction between 
performativity  
and Merton‘s notion of self-fulfilling prophecy. A current  
example suffices to illustrate the operation of the latter. The rumour  
spreads in mid-September 2007 that the Northern Rock is ‗in trouble‘.  
As a consequence customers rush to withdraw their deposits before  
everyone else does to avoid losing their money, in the process offering  
some wonderful television pictures of massive queues outside the bank‘s  
offices. Soon, the rumour turns into reality: the bank really has become  
insolvent, because people have become convinced that it is. Ferraro  
et al. (2005) are recent advocates of the power of self- fulfi lling 
prophecies.  
They suggest that theories can become true to the extent that  
people, acting on their ideas and underlying assumptions, actually make  
them come true. To demonstrate this, they suggest, one would need to  
show that implementation of the practices implied or recommended by  
the theory ‗had predictable, observable effects that caused the theory to  
correspond more closely to observed behavior … and that this expected  
behavior became more common as the theory itself gained acceptance, not  
before‘ (p. 13). Whilst they stress the importance of introducing 
practices,  
routines and organizational arrangements that create conditions favouring  
the predictions made in the theory, they still fail to grasp the signifi 
cance  
of all the materialities comprising the sociotechnical agencements  
which a particular theory‘s performativity has to unfold into. It is not 
the  
theory itself that can cause a sociotechnical agencement to exist. There  
are always other interests and forces involved, something which Zaloom  
and MacKenzie amply demonstrate in their books. Furthermore, economic  
models that are incorporated into such an agencement ‗can have effects  
even if those who use them are skeptical of the model‘s virtues, unaware  
of its details, or even ignorant of its very existence‘ (MacKenzie, 2006: 
19).  
Callon and MacKenzie also point out that performativity always leaves  
open the possibility of events that might refute, or even happen 
independently  
of, what humans believe or think. In 1987 the Black-Scholes-Merton  
model was no longer able to absorb current events and behaviours, but  
its inability to withstand the 1987 events was not due to a simple lack of  
belief in the formula.  
 
In conclusion, I wholeheartedly recommend these three books to readers  
with an interest in actor-network theory, economic sociology and/or  
good storytelling; and of course to those who have a desire to understand  
better the financial times we are living through.  
 
Notes  
 
1 FT editorial, 6 November 2007.  
 
2 Perhaps it made people aware of the magnitude and multiplication of 
instruments  
that lengthen the distance between financial instruments and actual  
underlying assets. In many cases these entities are simply circulating 
around  
fi nancial markets and their value is determined by fi nancial market 
activities  
whilst being rather tenuously related to any underlying referent (Knorr 
Cetina  
and Preda, 2005). The equity derivatives market alone expanded 39% to  
$10,000bn dollar during the first half of 2007 according to data from the 
International  
Swaps and Derivatives Association.  
 
3 MacKenzie and Millo (2003: 116) provide an important corollary when they  
reflect on the workings of the Chicago derivatives exchanges: ‗the very 
markets  
in which homo oeconomicus appears to thrive cannot be created (if they 
require  
the solution of col lective action problems, as in Chicago) by homines 
oeconomici.  
Chicago practice … contradicts Chicago theory, orthodox economics as 
famously  
pursued at the University of Chicago‘. This ‗alternation between 
calculative  
and non-calculative agencements‘ of traders is a bit like cross-dissolves 
in the  
movies, with altruism implying elements of calculation and vice versa, 
Callon  
(2007: 347) maintains: ‗economic markets cannot exist without moral 
agencements  
or, conversely, any altruistic agencement is calculated‘.  
 
4 The withering of exchange floors seems to have taken on an air of 
inevitability  
since the introduction of electronic trading. It was reported in November 
2007  
that the NYSE is planning to shut two of the overflow rooms of its historic  
trading floor, shrinking it back to the size it was 40 years ago. Some even 
predict  
the eventual closure of the fl oor.  
 
5 Whilst MacKenzie also introduces the weaker (and conceptually less 
interesting)  
versions of ‗generic‘ and ‗effective‘ performativity in the first chapter, 
they only  
play a minor part in the book and hence I will not elaborate on these.  
 
6 Copious newspaper column inches have been devoted to the 1987 crash on  
its 20th birthday. Ominously, various commentators pointed out that then,  
like in 2007, recent financial innovations played a major role in turning a  
rocky patch into a full-blown crisis. The use of ‗portfolio insurance‘, or 
computerized  
hedging strategies that were supposed to protect investors from  
downside losses, actually exacerbated the crash (a 22% drop in a single 
day)  
as sellers could not find any buyers, thus provoking an event with a 
probability  
of 10–160. Twenty years later the market experienced a new buyers‘ strike, 
this  
time of structured finance products like CDOs. As a little aside, Zaloom 
points  
out that the key argument in favour of preserving the pits at CBOT was that  
the open-outcry tradition was better suited to handle the human 
irrationalities  
that cause panics in the market. Even advocates of electronic dealing 
admitted  
that ‗Nobody does it better in times of market stress‘ (p. 53). Indeed, 
CBOT‘s  
pits were the only markets to stay open on 19 October.  
 
7 MacKenzie uses qualifications—hedging his bets as it were (excuse the  
pun)—throughout these chapters. For example: ‗the popularity of indexing  
has made a prediction of the Capital Asset Pricing Model that troubled 
Sharpe  
less untrue … Tests of the efficient-market hypothesis by those who 
generally  
supported it led to the identification of ―anomalies‖… [which] gave rise to  
investment strategies to exploit them, and the pursuit of those strategies 
seems  
often to have reduced or eliminated the anomalies‘ (p.30, emphasis added).  
 
8 These were computer generated sheets of theoretical prices for all the 
options  
traded on US option exchanges. A 1976 example is reproduced in the book  
on page 161.  
 
9 Many of the first drafts of the chapters were presented to a workshop 
held at  
the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris which also yielded a 
companion  
volume to this book (cf. Muniesa et al., 2007).  
 
10 Mirowski and Nik-Nah go a step further even and offer a cutting and 
entertaining  
critique of ANT, suggesting it is suffering from a ‗present impasse‘.  
 
11 Callon prefers the French word agencement over ‗socio-technical 
arrangement‘  
(cf. Zaloom above), in order to stress the fact that agencies and 
arrangements  
are not separate (Callon, 2005). Hardie and MacKenzie (2007) in their 
recent  
study also retain the French agencement because they feel the word-play 
does  
not carry over into its usual English rendering as ‗assemblage‘, ‗which has  
somewhat too passive a connotation‘ (p. 3).  
 
12 Interestingly, Callon is the only one of the contributors to the volume 
who  
actually acknowledges the fact Austin ultimately concluded that it was  
impossible to maintain the hypothesis of the existence of purely constative  
utterances.  
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